Perhaps it is mere symbolic diplomacy, but nonetheless, a signal to Washington that Russo-North Korean ties are not in decline.

Pyongyang did not hold back in blaming Pompeo for the stalled negotiations with the US, after two rounds of presidential-level summits.

It lambasted Pompeo’s “indulgence in reckless remarks” as evidence “that whenever Pompeo pokes his nose in, the talks go wrong without any results even from the point close to success”.

Putin calls for ‘international guarantees’ at first summit with Kim

The statement, from Kwon Jong-gun, director general of the foreign ministry’s American affairs department, affirmed Pyongyang’s wishes to have a “dialogue counterpart … who is more careful and mature in communicating with us”, should there be any “possible resumption of the dialogue with the US”.

This rhetoric from North Korea is likely to be a reaction to a statement made by Pompeo to the US Congress, where he branded Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and Kim Jong-un as “tyrants”.

The tit-for-tat rhetorical battles between Washington and Pyongyang have not yet abated. Yet, North Korea highlighted, once more, how relationships between Kim and Trump remain cordial.

Kim said at the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly that “the personal ties between me and him [Trump] are not hostile like the relations between the two countries”.

And Choe Son-hui reaffirmed post-Hanoi that the two leaders displayed a “chemistry” that was “mysteriously wonderful”.

Pyongyang seems increasingly suspicious of the Bolton and Pompeo double act, coupled with Kim Jong-un’s desire to be seen as having equal status to Trump.

The two leaders negotiating at the two summits have, for one thing, provided a means of justifying Kim’s policies across the domestic population.

Yet, Washington’s all-or-nothing approach towards dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue remains at odds with the North’s preferred incremental approach towards denuclearisation.

Pompeo and Bolton’s hawkish stance only widens the gulf between the two states’ negotiating strategies.

Only a few hours before the foreign ministry statement, North Korean state media announced that Kim had “guided a test-fire of a new-type [of] tactical guided weapon”, with a “peculiar mode of guiding flight and the load of a powerful warhead”.

The last “ultra-modern tactical weapon” test was carried out in November. But the Kim regime may not have abandoned its nuclear ambitions, even during a moratorium on missile and nuclear testing (the latest missile and nuclear tests came in 2017).

Kim’s dual policy of “byungjin” initiated in 2013, which calls for developing nuclear weapons and the economy simultaneously, was abandoned last year in favour of a “new strategic line”.

Instead of pursuing simultaneous nuclear and economic development, Kim declared in his 2018 New Year speech that North Korea had accomplished “the cause of perfecting the national nuclear forces”, suggesting a shift towards a closer focus on the economy.

We should not come to the quick conclusion that this tactical test is accelerating the end to the Pyongyang’s moratorium on missile and nuclear testing. But to dismiss the test as merely a symbol of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities may also underestimate the hermit state’s intentions.

Putin-Kim summit can aid peace process on Korean peninsula

Nuclear weapons continue to have importance for North Korea’s projection of itself as a modern and scientific power in the international system.

Although the days of fire and fury and of pushing nuclear buttons may – at least for now – be on hold, the US continues to be the North Korean state’s enemy, being the “cause that pushed us [North Korea] into a nuclear state”, as the latest foreign ministry statement said.

While “byungjin” may be over, that does not mean that nuclear development is off the agenda for Kim and the Workers’ Party of Korea.

Indeed, satellite imagery recently highlights the presence of railcars near the notorious Uranium Enrichment Facility and Radiochemical Laboratory at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre.

Again, it would be highly premature to infer that nuclear developments will arise out of this, but such activity does not eliminate the possibility of the North engaging in the transport of radioactive material, or reprocessing campaigns.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s calls for a third Trump-Kim summit, and his attempts to narrow the gap between Washington and Pyongyang continue.

Kim has given the US a time frame of the “end of this year” to “make a bold decision”, namely, sanctions removal.

While Russia remains tied by UN sanctions regarding economic relations with North Korea – and unwilling to violate its sanctions commitment – Pyongyang is making a concerted effort to keep its few international “friends” on side.

Diplomacy with Russia – even if only for the visual spectacle – not only pits Russia against the US, but also puts China in the mix. Exploiting great power politics seems to be one of Pyongyang’s strategies at present.

Indeed, it would not be surprising if a Xi-Kim summit occurs soon, given Kim’s visit to the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, after his trip to Russia.

Visiting two “friends” in the space of as many weeks is one way for Kim to show that North Korea is not leaving any options unexplored, as it continues to try to extract gains from the US.

Time to take note, Mr Pompeo.

Edward Howell is an ESRC scholar in international relations at the University of Oxford, specialising in East Asia and the Korean peninsula