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China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, speaks during a Security Council briefing on Ukraine at the UN headquarters in New York on April 5. Photo: Xinhua
Opinion
Emanuele Scimia
Emanuele Scimia

How Beijing’s stance on Russia and its Taiwan threats are hurting goodwill in Europe

  • Beijing has worked hard to build a consensus in many European quarters but an anti-China front is now building in the EU that could bury its 16+1 initiative
  • The Czech Republic has called Taiwan ‘bullied’, Sweden may upgrade its office in Taipei and Beijing’s envoy to eastern Europe received a chilly reception on a recent visit
When Chinese vice foreign minister Le Yucheng met Russian ambassador Andrey Denisov last week, he hailed the Sino-Russian partnership with words that sounded positively eerie to those in Europe: “No matter how the international landscape may change, China will continue to strengthen strategic coordination with Russia for win-win cooperation.”
Beijing’s ambiguity towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its repeated threats about Taiwan are breaking apart the consensus China has worked hard to build in many European quarters. That is especially true for the China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries cooperation mechanism, a 16+1 grouping that includes 11 European Union members.
China remains the EU’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade surpassing €695 billion (US$740 billion) last year, but this should not be misconstrued: China’s not-so-veiled association with Russia is angering Europeans.

The case of the Czech Republic is a typical example. Following in EU institutions’ footsteps, the Czech government recently told Chinese diplomats there would be significant consequences if their country were to violate or circumvent Western sanctions against Russia.

Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský also emphasised that Europe should help “bullied” democracies such as Taiwan – a clear reference to China’s sovereign claims on the island.

This is a U-turn on the Czech Republic’s relationship with China. President Milos Zeman once wanted to turn his country into an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for Chinese investment in Europe.

02:20

Heightened tensions in Taiwan amid Russian invasion of Ukraine

Heightened tensions in Taiwan amid Russian invasion of Ukraine
European initiatives and stances against China’s position are multiplying. Sweden’s parliament will soon debate a proposal to rename and upgrade the country’s representative office in Taiwan, a Swedish lawmaker said two weeks ago in Taipei during a visit.
It is worth noting that just allowing the word “Taiwanese” to be used in the name for Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in Lithuania has triggered a commercial retaliation from Beijing, which considers the island a “rebel province”.
As far as the Ukraine-Russia conflict is concerned, Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin has said that the EU should “make sure” China is on the right side of the story – Le’s remarks to the Russian ambassador suggest the Chinese believe they are.
While Sweden has often sparred with China over the Xi Jinping administration’s record on human rights, Finland had no major disagreements with Beijing until the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania are also taking a tougher approach to China.

The EU usually challenges China’s threats with sectoral trade tools rather than political measures. How the European bloc has been addressing the China-Lithuania dispute is illustrative of its traditional modus operandi.

Why reaction to Russia’s Ukraine invasion should give China pause

The EU has reported China to the World Trade Organization for coercive practices against Lithuania, giving an economic-procedural response when the issue is in fact a political one. European chanceries and institutions must support Lithuania, but at the same time did not want to rile China.

In January, Matas Maldeikis, head of the Lithuanian Parliament’s Friendship Group with Taiwan, told me that many Europeans actually started realising the need to change their engagement with China before its dispute with Lithuania.

01:48

Taiwanese supporters queue up to buy Lithuanian rum held up by mainland China

Taiwanese supporters queue up to buy Lithuanian rum held up by mainland China

“This is a general trend caused first of all by China’s behaviour,” he said. “As Xi Jinping’s administration is strengthening the party’s control over the Chinese economy and is turning away from reform and opening-up principles, EU nations naturally have to redesign their approach to Beijing.”

Central and eastern European countries understand that despite Beijing’s proclamations, Chinese investment has always gone to western Europe.

In February last year, six EU member states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) were represented by second-tier ministers at the annual summit of the China-CEE “17+1” group (when Lithuania was still part of the China-backed forum), in what several observers interpreted as an affront to President Xi.

Why is tiny Lithuania challenging the Big Panda?

China’s outright assistance to Russia, especially any military support, would further harden Europe’s posture. After the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is highly likely that an attack on Taiwan would cross Europe’s red lines in its relations with Beijing.

The EU could probably take a firmer position against Beijing if Taipei were willing to establish semiconductor foundries in Europe. Eric Huang, head of the Taiwanese representative office in Lithuania, said last month that Taiwan was ready to develop a project combining Lithuanian laser and Taiwanese semiconductor technologies.

Despite Le’s resounding words on the Sino-Russian partnership, China is in damage control mode. Last week, it sent Huo Yuzhen, the special representative for central and eastern Europe, to tour the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Poland.

07:14

What China could gain, and lose, in the Ukraine-Russia crisis

What China could gain, and lose, in the Ukraine-Russia crisis

The reception was chilly, at least in Prague. Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Martin Tlapa told the Chinese envoy that Beijing’s close cooperation with Russia risks undermining ties with the EU bloc.

Then there is China’s ratification of two International Labour Organization conventions on forced labour last week, viewed as an attempt to reactivate the EU’s ratification process for the comprehensive investment deal agreed to in principle in December 2020.
Just as Russia’s attack on Ukraine has reinvigorated Nato, with previously neutral Sweden and Finland set to apply to join the alliance, China’s attitude towards the Ukrainian crisis could cement a vast anti-Chinese front within the EU – a nemesis of the 16+1 initiative.
This time around, the Beijing-friendly industries in Germany and France might be unable to preserve China-Europe ties along the old lines. The sinking of Nord Stream 2, a German-Russian megaproject, proves that geopolitics’ imperatives now trump economic considerations.

Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst

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