How China’s unique value system underpins its prosperity and innovation
- A new book by MIT professor Yasheng Huang suggests China’s political economy has long operated under a mix of autonomy and control
- The nation’s development strategy has largely reached its limits and Beijing must now harness its innovative potential to spur its ‘animal spirits’ while pursuing greater liberalisation
Before the keju system was introduced, China was producing some of history’s most transformative inventions such as gunpowder, the compass and paper. Huang’s empirical research suggests Chinese creativity peaked between 220 and 581, during the rather chaotic Han-Sui interregnum. “The first wave of technological stagnation in China,” Huang observes, “coincides with the end of China’s political fragmentation.”
The book does seem to overstate some aspects of the historical record to offer a “cleaner” narrative than might be warranted. A data set of prime ministerial resignations forms the basis of Huang’s conclusion that, with the introduction of keju, checks and balances between emperors and their bureaucrats disappeared in favour of a “symbiotic relationship”.
Huang can also be extremely perceptive such as when he challenges David Landes’ judgment that the state kills technological progress. Huang argues that “China’s early lead in technology was derived critically – and possibly exclusively – from the role of the state.” Quoting the Nobel laureate economist Douglass North, he writes: “If you want to realise the potential of modern technology, you cannot do it with the state, but you cannot do without [the state], either.”
But what kind of state? In Huang’s view, autocracy “has deep roots in China because of its near-immaculate design, absence of civil society, and deep-seated values and norms”. But China’s tendency toward “unitary rule”, he writes, is fundamentally cultural, with the “causal direction” of autocracy running “from culture to politics, not the other way around”.
But there are reasons to believe China’s state structures and policy preferences are not just cultural in origin, but also – or perhaps rather – the result of deliberate institutional arrangements. In any case, a narrow focus on China’s top-down structures can obscure the bottom-up nature of many aspects of Chinese political and economic life.
Huang notes that China’s political economy is also characterised by autonomy. China has benefited from state management in the form of deliberate, top-down policies but private initiatives that are bottom-up and chaotic have also proved vital to its development. Understanding the balance between control and autonomy is essential to any assessment of the challenges China faces.
Unfortunately, Huang’s account lacks a nuanced assessment of the relationship between rent-seeking and value creation. He might have noted that China’s “elite quality” is much higher than that of other countries with the same per capita GDP. Instead, it is comparable to European Union countries with triple China’s per capita GDP.
Whatever comes next will be based on China’s unique traditional value system, which, as Huang emphasises, has underpinned prosperity and innovation in the past. And it will reflect the grit – not rigidity – that lies at the core of China’s political economy.
Zhang Jun, dean of the School of Economics at Fudan University, is director of the China Center for Economic Studies, a Shanghai-based think tank