Philippines’ new playbook is a threat to South China Sea peace

By playing the victim and packaging ‘grey zone’ ops as humanitarian resupply missions for fishermen, Manila means to put Beijing on the defensive
What’s uncertain is whether China will respond and, if so, how as policy voices call for the Philippines to be taught a lesson

Zhihua Zheng

Published: 9:00am, 10 Mar 2024

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Looking at the Philippines’ recent actions at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, it is clear the Marcos Jnr administration has adopted a new playbook for the South China Sea.

On the one hand, Manila is following the examples of China and Vietnam by subsidising its fishermen, enabling them to be at the forefront of “grey zone” operations at sea. On the other hand, it is adopting an “assertive transparency” strategy, increasing exposure and even creating opportunities for accidents that Beijing accuses it of staging to gain more international attention and sympathy.

Why is Manila adopting these two approaches and how have they been put into practice? And how might Beijing respond? It is also important to consider the implications of the new developments for peace and stability in the South China Sea. What will all this ultimately lead to?

The reason behind Manila’s new approaches is the significant disparity in maritime law enforcement and naval power between the Philippines and China. Manila lacks the capability to get Beijing to withdraw from disputed areas like Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

To ensure the constant presence of its maritime law enforcement in the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal however, providing “humanitarian supplies” to Filipino fishermen operating in the area can be used as a plausible pretext.

There is also a legal aspect. The 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling only confirms that Filipino fishermen possess traditional fishing rights in the waters of Scarborough Shoal.

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But the ruling does not address the issue of whether the Philippine coastguard or Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources has the authority to patrol or enforce laws in the waters of the shoal. The latter involves the issue of territorial sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, which is outside the scope of an arbitral tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Hence, Manila has devised a strategy combining Philippine-style grey-area operations and so-called assertive transparency to contest China’s control over Scarborough Shoal, aiming to return to the situation before the 2012 naval stand-off.

Last June, the Philippines unveiled the LAYAG WPS project (Livelihood Activities to Enhance Fisheries Yield and Economic Gains from the West Philippine Sea) to provide critical resources including equipment, fuel and livelihood support to Filipino fishermen in disputed areas such as Scarborough Shoal. It also aims to consolidate the Philippines’ presence and claims in the disputed region.

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As part of this, Manila earmarked 2.5 billion pesos (US$44.5 million) for the acquisition of floating assets to enhance the country’s presence in the West Philippine Sea and support Filipino fishermen. A recent mission delivered 44,900 litres of diesel and other supplies to fisherfolk at Scarborough Shoal, where the government is helping as many as 44 Philippine fishing boats.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr has directed the Philippine coastguard and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to continue their deployments around Scarborough Shoal, stressing the Philippines “will not allow any attempt by any foreign power to take even one square inch of our sovereign territory”.

Yet, if the LAYAG initiative was simply intended to aid fishermen’s livelihoods, surely it would be easier to give out the subsidies and supplies on shore than in the middle of the ocean. It should be also noted that China restored Filipino fishing access to the surrounding waters of Scarborough Shoal in 2016, after then-president Rodrigo Duterte visited Beijing. The shoal has remained accessible to Filipino fishermen since.

By acting under the banner of protecting fishermen’s livelihoods and delivering humanitarian supplies, Manila is trying to limit the space for protest from Beijing and camouflage its potentially provocative moves. Its unique packaging of its grey-zone operations as humanitarian resupply missions is meant to put Beijing on the defensive.

When Manila is challenged over the reinforcing of its coastguard’s presence around Scarborough Shoal or faces obstacles in delivering construction materials to Second Thomas Shoal, it skilfully shifts the blame onto Beijing, turning to media channels to accuse it of mistreating Filipino personnel and engaging in bullying behaviour.

Manila’s “assertive transparency” in portraying itself as the victim does not address any of the underlying issues or consequences but it does succeed in attracting a lot of attention. The narratives of China’s bullying behaviour and environmentally degrading activities put out by the Philippines strongly resonate with both domestic and international audiences. They also boost the image of Filipino leaders as courageous individuals willing to confront a powerful nation.

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There should be concern over whether China will accept this. Since the second half of last year, China has increased its countermeasures, with many voices in Chinese policy circles advocating for teaching the Philippines a lesson for its reckless behaviour. Chinese coastguards may once again expel Filipino fishermen from the waters of Scarborough Shoal.

On the other hand, Beijing seems to recognise the need to separate the issue of maritime security in the South China Sea from the regular economic exchanges between the two countries. However, it remains unclear how or if these South China tussles will affect economic and other collaboration between the two countries.

The situation in the South China Sea has entered a new phase. Stakeholders in the region are employing various strategies, tactics and tools. As politicians prioritise self-interest, the goodwill and trust between the parties are diminishing.

The fear is that the situation in the South China Sea could worsen, descending into unrestrained and deceitful behaviours, with covert methods driving an escalation of tensions, which would have a severe impact on the region’s peace and stability.

Zhihua Zheng is an associate professor and head of the East Asia Marine Policy Project at the Centre for Japanese Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University