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A Cathay Pacific Airways plane takes off at Hong Kong International Airport on January 11. The airline seems to be set on a disappointing downward trajectory. Photo: Dickson Lee
Opinion
Albert Cheng
Albert Cheng

Crumbling Cathay no longer flies the flag for Hong Kong’s aviation dream

  • The airline has struggled to find its feet post pandemic, cancelling flights in peak season, cutting standards for its pilot captains and entering the budget flights market
  • After a government bailout, swingeing staff cuts and serious service lapses, Cathay can no longer be considered a premium airline
Is Cathay Pacific Airways past its prime? Its recent performance raises questions whether this 78-year-old airline can drive Hong Kong in the race to retain the city’s status as a premium aviation hub in the Asia-Pacific.
The Hong Kong Airport Authority recently raised HK$5 billion (US$640 million) in retail bonds to fund capital expenditures, including its third runway project. Public response has been overwhelming. But hardware aside, it is also vital for the city’s flagship carrier to deliver. Yet Cathay Pacific seems to be set on a disappointing downward trajectory.

Founded in 1946 by two former air force pilots, Cathay started off with a converted Douglas DC3 called Betsy. When I left the company’s affiliated maintenance operation in 1968, the Cathay fleet had increased to eight aircraft. It then took off with a reputation for safety, reliability and friendliness.

Its success could be attributed primarily to the professionalism of both its cockpit and cabin crew. The airline took pride in its highly trained British and Australian pilots. Its pool of stewardesses was a mix of smiling faces from Hong Kong and elsewhere. Passengers did not mind paying 10-20 per cent more for the quality, reliability and friendliness. Cathay was the first choice for many, especially Hongkongers. This is sadly no longer the case.

Air travel plunged during the pandemic. In December 2020, for example, Cathay’s passenger numbers fell by 98.7 per cent year on year. In June 2020, the Hong Kong government rescued Cathay with a HK$27.3 billion bailout.
Pay cuts, redundancies and voluntary unpaid leave ensued. Cathay laid off almost 6,000 employees in October 2020. In total, the airline cut nearly a quarter of its positions. On top of that, according to the Hong Kong Aircrew Officers Association, which represents Cathay pilots, an estimated 1,000 pilots have resigned over the past few years.

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Explainer: Why are airfares so expensive and when will they get cheaper?

Explainer: Why are airfares so expensive and when will they get cheaper?

The slash is so deep that Cathay has not been able to recover its charm in the post-Covid landscape. A decade ago, Cathay was named the Skytrax Best Airline for the fourth time, the first airline to achieve such an honour. In recent years, it has been superseded by Qatar Airways, which has won it seven times, and Singapore Airlines, which has won it five times.

Local press, notably the Oriental Daily News, has time and again described Cathay as a mismanaged airline that has lost its appeal.

Singapore Airlines’ fortunes are soaring. And Hong Kong’s Cathay Pacific?

Over the Christmas and new year season, the company cancelled dozens of flights at short notice, disrupting the plans of thousands of holidaymakers. The company’s excuse was that too many pilots had come down with “seasonal illness”, essentially the flu.
The Civil Aviation Department said this was “extremely undesirable” and asked Cathay to submit a review. If this was a franchised bus company, its licence could have been revoked for such a major lapse of service at such a critical period. The least Cathay can do is to reduce its premium airfares, as it is no longer a premium airline.
Cathay came in for criticism after cancelling dozens of flights at short notice over Christmas and new year. Photo: Dickson Lee
The next challenge is the Lunar New Year. Cathay has pledged not to repeat the fiasco. But instead of ensuring adequate manpower to meet the spike in demand, the management could only come up with a quick fix, by reducing the number of flights in advance.
Instead of offering better packages to win back or replace the lost talent, Cathay has opted to lower the bar. The airline has, for instance, cut the time needed to become a captain by allowing first officers apply for captain training after 3,000 flying hours. The standard used to be 4,000 hours. The union has cast doubt on the change.
Cathay once took pride in its business strategy of not getting into the budget airline muddle. But in an about-turn, it shut down its regional subsidiary, Cathay Dragon, in October 2020, laying off almost all the pilots, cabin crew and other staff, and then planned for Hong Kong Express Airways, which it had acquired, to fly some of the old Dragon routes as a low-cost, stand-alone airline.

The manoeuvre is seen as another move to use cheaper pilots and other staff to replace the more experienced and expensive ones.

Unlike a few years ago, it may not be a bad idea now to let Air China replace Cathay as Hong Kong’s flagship carrier. At least, we can better tap the national carrier’s bigger fleet and flight crew to meet the surge in demand. After all, as some have noted, Hong Kong has already devolved into little more than just another Chinese city.

Albert Cheng King-hon is a political commentator

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