US-China tensions: Asean playbook shows how small states can navigate big power rivalry

Asean has carved its own path with shrewd balancing, hedging and consolidation, showing that small and medium-sized powers can navigate the increasingly turbulent dynamics between the two countries

Brian Y. S. Wong

Published: 9:30am, 21 Jan 2024

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On December 30, one day before Indonesia’s Asean chairmanship lapsed, the region’s foreign ministers issued a statement articulating their “concern” over “recent developments in the South China Sea that may undermine peace, security, and stability in the region”.

This statement from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations came after months of escalating tensions between Chinese and Filipino vessels, amid growing concern that the region would be dragged into US-China strategic competition. It affirmed Southeast Asian sovereignty in “our maritime sphere” and pressed for restraint.

It is tempting to view the Sino-American rivalry as a zero-sum, two-player game. Yet the US and China make up only 22 per cent of the world’s population. Regional powers, even small and medium-sized states, can and should exercise their agency in navigating the increasingly turbulent dynamics between the two countries. Their people deserve better than their governments’ passive acquiescence to a polarised world order.

Countries can take a leaf out of Asean’s playbook. Despite its economic intertwinement with and proximity to China, and strategic and military ties with the United States, Southeast Asia has carved its own path. Through shrewd balancing, hedging and consolidation, Southeast Asian nations show that small and medium-sized powers deserve a seat at the table.

First, Asean states are adept practitioners of dynamic balancing. They not only position themselves as uniquely useful and open to collaboration with both Beijing and Washington but also ensure the region remains neutral with no overarching tilt.

The former manifests best in the pro-trade courting of foreign investment from both the US private sector and China’s state-owned and private enterprises.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, for instance, has convinced Tesla to set up its regional headquarters in Selangor and broached the incorporation of Starlink into Malaysia’s digital infrastructure. Through his Beijing trip and the China-Asean Expo in Nanning, Anwar’s government has secured billions of dollars worth of trade deals and investments from China, seizing upon China’s recalibration of its foreign loans and global engagement after the pandemic.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim meets Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 31. Photo: Xinhua

Thailand and, more recently, Vietnam are long-standing practitioners of “bamboo diplomacy”, defined by both resilience and flexile adaptiveness. The rift between the military-led Thai government and the US after the 2014 coup has mended with pro-business Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s ascent to power last year.

Vietnam recently upgraded its relationship with the US to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, ranking its Vietnam war opponent as equivalent to China and Russia in its diplomatic hierarchy. In rendering themselves indispensable to both Chinese and American strategies in the region, Southeast Asian nations gain the licence to not have to choose between them.

As Indonesian President Joko Widodo declared while presiding over the 2022 G20 summit, as he firmly pushed back against sharpening rivalries, Asean will not be “a proxy to any power”.

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US, Japan and Philippines hold first joint coastguard exercise in the South China Sea

While some would suggest the pro-China leanings of Cambodia and Laos or the Philippines’ increasing collaboration with the US would precipitate regional splintering, it is precisely the ability of countries to temporarily assume leanings that exempts the region from an unequivocal alignment.

Second, as Professor Kuik Cheng-Chwee at the National University of Malaysia put it, Asean “hedges between feasibility and desirability”. These states seek to minimise unhelpful uncertainty and diversify strategically in their dealings with all major powers.

At the Asia Future Summit in October last year, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stressed that “One China is the basis on which nearly every country in the world recognise the [People’s Republic of China], and has informal, unofficial relations with Taiwan”.

Asean wants no part in US-China rivalry or an unjust war over Taiwan

As the largest regional economy and fourth most populous nation, Indonesia has made clear its intentions to broker a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, resisting trenchant Western calls for further militarisation while turning non-alignment into a source of moral leadership and soft power.

Internationally, the region has looked beyond China and the US for alternative partners.

In recent years, EU-Asean ties have deepened considerably as European Union countries eye more resilient supply chains and Asean diversifies its markets and sources of foreign direct investment. At the 25th Asean-India senior officials’ meeting last year, India and Asean pledged to increase collaboration in ensuring regional peace and security, and in areas ranging from science and technology to agriculture.

With Malaysia and Indonesia sharing a strong religious connection with the Gulf states, they are well positioned to cultivate greater access to the cutting-edge technology and deep capital reserves of the region. Such multilateral, multi-track dynamism is crucial to enabling Asean states to weather the fallout from a potential deterioration in the Sino-American relationship.

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Myanmar faces its biggest challenge yet to its rule amid recent setbacks in war with rebel groups

Third, Asean states have sought to consolidate and strengthen their synergy. During its chairmanship in 2021, Brunei played a sizeable role in negotiating with Myanmar’s junta amid the country’s civil war. This year, Thailand may be best placed to continue to work for peace and reconciliation in Myanmar.

Inter-Asean trade is growing, as are people-to-people and cultural exchanges, innovation and technology-sharing, and climate efforts. Accelerating cross-border payments and connectivity will further lower barriers to trade, work and travel, while cross-national infrastructural projects – such as the proposed Malaysia-Singapore high-speed rail – will streamline the region’s supply chain.

Regional bodies elsewhere like Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) can learn from Asean in bolstering transport interconnectivity and infrastructural synergy to unlock potential.

For Asean, full alignment on all key international issues remains elusive but given it seeks a more pragmatic solidarity, this is not a prerequisite. While there is the perennial risk of divide and conquer, Southeast Asian nations have shown the world how to weather the storm – for now.

Brian Wong is an assistant professor in philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, and a Rhodes Scholar and adviser on strategy for the Oxford Global Society