Why India and Vietnam won’t be joining US’ China containment
Aside from scepticism at Biden’s stab at realpolitik after criticising authoritarian regimes, both Vietnam and India prefer a world dominated by neither the US nor China
As developing nations, they are interested in Western technology and investment but neither wishes to, nor can afford to, confront China
“I don’t want to contain China,” declared US President Joe Biden during his historic visit to Vietnam this month. “We’re not trying to hurt China,” he insisted, underscoring his administration’s commitment to “getting the relationship right” rather than pursuing a containment strategy.
Buoyed by booming economic ties, Biden upgraded US relations with Vietnam to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, paving the way for deeper defence and security cooperation. Just days earlier, he met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi, and also discussed strategic cooperation.
Crucially, he announced at the Group of 20 meeting a new transcontinental infrastructure initiative to enhance connectivity among India and US allies in the Middle East and Europe.
By all indications, Biden’s Asia visit was primarily about China, with a focus on corralling Asia’s rising powers against it. But neither India nor Vietnam is interested in aligning with the US, nor can they afford to confront China.
If anything, the non-aligned nations would rather keep relations with an ascendant Beijing on an even keel. Crucially, both India and Vietnam prefer a truly multipolar world, dominated by neither the US nor China.
Early in his presidency, Biden sought to distinguish himself from his notoriously transactional predecessor, Donald Trump, by underscoring how the promotion of democracy would be a tenet of his foreign policy. Accordingly, he launched the Summit for Democracy, gathering leaders across the democratic world in Washington.
President Joe Biden speaks alongside Secretary of State Antony Blinken during a Summit for Democracy virtual plenary in the South Court Auditorium, on the White House campus, on March 29. Photo: AP
At times, Biden went as far as casting his foreign policy in purely ideological terms by arguing that the 21st century will be a showdown between democratic and authoritarian powers. More than halfway through his term, however, he has increasingly embraced a more realpolitik approach to bolster his increasingly hawkish China policy.
Notably, Biden skipped two vital democracies during his latest trip to Asia, including the Philippines, a treaty ally set to host an expanded American military presence. Crucially, he was also a no-show at the Asean summit in nearby Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy.
In contrast to his lukewarm, if not frosty, relations with vibrant democracies such as Indonesia, Biden put on the charm during his visits to Vietnam, a country led by a communist party, and India, a state in the grip of authoritarian populism. In the past, Biden has excluded Vietnam from the Summit for Democracy and criticised the Modi administration’s authoritarian tendencies.
But he was all business on this latest trip, skirting human rights issues and doubling down on strategic cooperation.
In New Delhi, Biden hailed agreements, including US help to produce Indian fighter jet engines and the new India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which bypasses both the China-led Belt and Road Initiative and Iran’s Chabahar port-centred International North-South Transport Corridor.
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Joe Biden says US and Vietnam ‘deepening cooperation’
Joe Biden says US and Vietnam ‘deepening cooperation’
In Vietnam, Biden discussed deeper defence cooperation, especially in the contested South China Sea, while a contingent of top American business executives explored ways to expand the production of vital technologies, including semiconductors. In short, Washington sought to integrate New Delhi and Hanoi into its broader “integrated deterrence” strategy against a rising China.
There are three reasons, however, to be sceptical. First, Vietnam is in no mood to align with any superpower, especially the US. To begin with, it is sceptical about the prospects of any large-scale US defence deals, partly thanks to its structural dependence on Russian weapons systems and the lingering opposition in Washington to large-scale military cooperation with the communist regime.
Crucially, Hanoi’s leadership is doubling down on party-to-party ties with Beijing to de-escalate tensions, both in trade and maritime disputes. Last year, Vietnam’s paramount leader Nguyen Phu Trong became the first foreign leader to visit President Xi Jinping after his historic third election. If anything, Hanoi’s increasingly conservative leadership is more concerned with Western-inspired “colour revolutions” than a direct armed conflict with fellow communist China.
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Xi Jinping says China will build stable supply chain with Vietnam
Xi Jinping says China will build stable supply chain with Vietnam
While Hanoi is focused on regime stability amid growing economic interaction with the West, New Delhi has been pushing for a global multipolar order. Despite superficially sharing political values with the West, India, now the world’s most populous nation, is committed to a world where non-Western powers enjoy greater strategic autonomy.
This largely explains India’s active participation in a whole host of non-Western groupings, most notably Brics (a bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It also explains why New Delhi has adamantly insulated its extensive ties with anti-Western powers such as Russia and Iran.
And this brings us to the final factor, namely the importance of maintaining stable ties with China. Despite all the talk of “decoupling”, there is growing evidence that rising powers such as Vietnam have become even more dependent on Chinese technological inputs and investments for their export industries.
As for India, its efforts to supplant China as a global production hub remain aspirational, given the depth of its infrastructural and manufacturing challenges. Like Vietnam, India is in no mood to exacerbate its territorial disputes with a far more powerful China.
As developing nations, the strategic priority in both Hanoi and New Delhi is to strengthen their economic and military foundations, instead of aligning with the West against a formidable neighbour.
India and Vietnam are interested in having the cake of Western technology and investments while also dining on the benefits of stable ties with a powerful China. It remains to be seen how long these non-aligned powers can exploit the rivalry.
Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific, and the forthcoming Duterte’s Rise
