China-Russia relations are strong enough to withstand the occasional spat

The Chinese embassy’s protest against the treatment of a Chinese influencer at the Russian border is not a sign of a crack in relations. Neither is China’s participation at the Saudi-sponsored peace summit on Ukraine
Beijing’s and Moscow’s shared interests in geopolitics outweigh any minor disagreements

Raffaello Pantucci

Published: 1:00am, 10 Aug 2023

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A spat over a viral video of a group of Chinese citizens being detained at the Russian border has escalated into a rebuke of Moscow by Beijing. Coming at around the same time that China chose to attend a Saudi-sponsored and Western-backed peace summit on the Ukraine war, it has been interpreted in some quarters as a shift by China away from Russia.

This is manifestly not the case, and again reflects a failure to properly analyse the Sino-Russian relationship. Such misunderstanding is the foundation of bad policy choices. There is no doubt Beijing and Moscow have disagreements, but what international partnership doesn’t?

In part, the problem in this case lies in the medium. The fact that the story about a group of Chinese being detained trying to cross the border from Kazakhstan into Russia was captured on video, included a prominent video blogger, and was widely shared on Chinese social media, suggests some level of tacit approval by government censors.

The fact that the Chinese embassy in Moscow chose to weigh in as well only adds to this sentiment. Consequently, the conclusion is that President Xi Jinping must have a view on this matter, which equates to a rebuke of Russia.

This interpretation fails in a number of ways. First, it assumes a level of conformity in the Chinese system which does not exist. There is no doubt that there is only one decider within Beijing, but underneath him there is a warren of institutions with their own motivations and internal pressures.

This does not mean they will contradict the centre (though sometimes they seem to), but there have also been moments when internal directives or goals have come into conflict.

A still from the video posted by blogger who goes by the name of Jin Wenxin, on Douyin. Chinese diplomats have lodged a protest with the Russian authorities after Jin and his friends were questioned for more than four hours and denied entry into Russia from Kazakhstan. Photo: Douyin

At the same time, it is worth noting that the lofty rhetoric piled onto the China-Russia relationship by central leaders in both capitals does not always reflect public views. A number of prominent Chinese scholars have expressed their concern about the inadvisability of the war in Ukraine. Some have even gone so far as to say it presages a loss of Russian influence on the world stage.

At a public level, you do not need to go as far as Heilongjiang’s borders with the Amur Oblast to find animosities between the Chinese and Russian publics. Repeated surveys and interviews with Chinese citizens since the invasion have shown more ambivalent views towards the invasion than the official policy might suggest.

Zhongnanhai is not unaware of this sentiment. But being aware of it, and letting off a bit of steam online, is not evidence of a rebuke of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Allowing Chinese social media and an outpost of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to mouth off about choices made by some random border guards along Russia’s lengthy border with Kazakhstan is hardly going to derail Xi’s central messaging about China’s relationship with Russia.

The fact that one of the Chinese citizens involved has almost a million followers online is doubtless also relevant. It is a painless acknowledgement of public opinion, which changes nothing in material terms.

Similarly, attending a summit organised by Saudi Arabia, a power with which Beijing has been actively working a great deal of late (most recently opening direct flight routes between Riyadh, Jeddah and Beijing), is more a nod to Riyadh’s sensibilities than Western ones. It is also hardly a clear rebuke of Putin, who has chosen to watch the summit from the sidelines.

In fact, foreign ministers Sergey Lavrov and Wang Yi spoke by phone soon after the summit, highlighting their continued desire to project proximity around views on Ukraine. It also provided Lavrov with an opportunity to congratulate Wang on his return to the hot seat in the foreign service.

02:26

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In other words, there is little evidence to take away from these incidents that China and Russia are drifting apart. The China-Russia relationship is driven by geopolitical realities and shaped by a blend of tension and overriding strategic alignment. This balancing act should be familiar to other powers who also have to work with leaders that are both close allies while at the same time publicly seen as figures of opprobrium.

For example, many in Europe were (and are) horrified by former US president Donald Trump, yet the transatlantic alliance held strong – as evidenced by the unified response to the subsequent invasion of Ukraine.

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There is no doubt that Moscow and Beijing are in lockstep at a geostrategic level – in many ways similar to what we see in the West, where partners are constantly reaffirming their determination to support Ukraine and confront authoritarians.

But we are not in the binary communist-versus-capitalist world of the Cold War. We are, instead, in a confusing world of middle powers where clean lines do not exist. Cross-border trade and investment continues, and confusing strategic triangles abound everywhere.

The talk is of de-risking, and coercion rather than separation and blunt force (though clearly there is still a role for this). Within this global environment, a China-Russia relationship can be both without limits and also highly critical. The key to the China-Russia relationship is action, which continues to show they favour each other geopolitically. The net loser from this is the people of Ukraine.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore