Philippine power struggles add to Marcos Jnr’s tough US-China balancing act

Marcos Jnr’s pivot towards the US is dividing his coalition government even as the EDCA defence pact with Washington draws Beijing’s ire
As he embarks on his second year in office, managing China and US defence ties will be doubly crucial

Richard Heydarian

Published: 12:30am, 26 Jul 2023

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“We are slowly making progress because the key to that is the improved communication between the Philippine government and the Chinese government,” said President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr after the latest negotiations over disputed fisheries resources in the South China Sea.

Just days earlier, the Philippines had also hosted a goodwill visit by a People’s Liberation Army Navy contingent. China’s embassy in Manila described the naval visit as a “steady step in [bilateral] defence cooperation” vital to “implementing the important consensus” between both countries’ leaders. Recently, top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi said China was ready to start a “new golden era” with the Philippines.

Marcos Jnr has emphasised the importance of robust communication channels in managing maritime disputes with China. This was consistent with his election-era vow to prioritise dialogue over confrontation when dealing with the Philippines’ biggest trading partner. Hopes for fruitful relations with China, however, have been undercut by growing disagreement over America’s military presence in the Southeast Asian country.

In particular, Marcos Jnr’s decision to implement and even expand the controversial Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which grants the Pentagon access to prized Philippine military facilities, has drawn criticism from Beijing and key Filipino figures, including former president Rodrigo Duterte. Managing the increasingly contentious relations with China will be among Marcos Jnr’s greatest policy challenges in his second year in office.

Fresh into power, Marcos Jnr, the namesake son of the former Filipino strongman, wasted no time to “reintroduce” his country and rehabilitate his notorious family’s political reputation. He recalibrated his predecessor’s violent “drug war” in favour of a more rehabilitation-focused approach, while adopting a more conciliatory tone with liberal media outlets. He also visited many countries and partners in his first year and attended the World Economic Forum in Switzerland.

His most consequential move, however, was on the foreign policy front. An authoritative survey released earlier this year showed that more than 80 per cent of Filipinos wanted the country to develop stronger ties with traditional allies to protect its South China Sea interests. Another survey, published soon after Marcos Jnr was elected, showed the US, Australia and Japan were Filipinos’ most trusted foreign partners. In contrast, China was largely viewed with mistrust.

In a nod to popular opinion, Marcos Jnr rapidly restored ties with traditional Western allies, most notably the United States. He also adopted a more uncompromising stance on maritime disputes and pressed China on unfulfilled big-ticket infrastructure projects. Things came to head, however, when he suddenly ramped up defence cooperation with the US, culminating in the expanded EDCA deal weeks after his Beijing visit.

Under the defence pact, the Pentagon was granted access to strategically located sites, including several close to the South China Sea and Taiwan’s southern shores. During his Pentagon visit last May, Marcos Jnr also oversaw the signing of new defence guidelines aimed at enhancing joint deterrence capabilities, with China clearly in mind.

But it was precisely at this point that Marcos Jnr’s strategic ambivalence kicked in. On at least two occasions, shortly before as well as during his visit to Washington, he vowed to ensure EDCA sites would not be used for “offensive” purposes against China. This contradicted the Philippines military, which said the EDCA bases could be used for joint operations in emergencies.

The differing statements from Manila betray a profound sense of strategic ambivalence and political anxiety. It explains why the Marcos Jnr administration is yet to finalise the precise contours of the EDCA, namely the number of US troops to be rotationally stationed and the type of weapons systems to be deployed.

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To begin with, there is a serious element of domestic politics at play. In recent months, open spats have broken out within the ruling coalition. Former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, a congresswoman, was recently demoted. Soon after, Vice-President Sara Duterte resigned from the ruling party in protest.

Aside from internal power struggles, one major area of tension has been what was perceived to be Arroyo’s misgivings about Marcos Jnr’s foreign policy. Both Arroyo and the Dutertes have been chief advocates of warmer ties with Beijing, often keeping Washington at arm’s length.

Former president Duterte also upped the ante by warning that the EDCA could drag the Philippines into a US-China nuclear showdown. As if that wasn’t enough, he visited Beijing last week, meeting President Xi Jinping. Whether the trip was coordinated with the Philippine government, it looked like a direct challenge to Marcos Jnr’s increasingly tough stance towards China.

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Externally, Marcos Jnr also faces a major dilemma. Throughout his first year in office, he characterised China as an indispensable development partner, particularly with regard to infrastructure. But his EDCA policy has drawn Beijing’s ire.

Chinese diplomats have warned Manila against “stoking the fire”, while Chinese maritime forces have stepped up their presence in Philippine-claimed waters in recent months. As a result, Marcos Jnr is confronting the potential loss of Chinese investments and the prospect of direct confrontation in the South China Sea.

It’s unclear what reassurances Marcos Jnr may have secured from the US. But what is clear is that in attempting to rebalance foreign relations, follow popular sentiment and rehabilitate his family’s image, he risks falling into a perilous geopolitical trap with huge domestic political implications.

Managing relations with China and subtly calibrating the EDCA question will be crucial not only to Marcos Jnr’s foreign policy success, but also his political standing at home. It will be a tough balancing act.

Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific, and the forthcoming Duterte’s Rise

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