South China Sea: three barriers to a fully fledged Philippines-Vietnam alliance
Despite Marcos Jnr’s best efforts, Manila and Hanoi will have to first overcome mistrust, strategic and ideological differences, and their lack of military operational compatibility
President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr spoke of the Philippines’ “burgeoning” ties with Vietnam the first time he met Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, on the sidelines of the Asean summit in Cambodia last November.
Later that month, the Philippine president hosted Vietnam’s National Assembly chairman Vuong Dinh Hue in Malacanang Palace, where his special guest spoke of the need to “do more to enhance the relationships between our political parties and government-to-government and parliament-to-parliament relationships”.
Last month, Marcos Jnr met Pham again on the sidelines of the Asean summit in Indonesia to continue discussions, including on South China Sea disputes. Marcos underscored the need to “talk sincerely” and “find a way” to ensure the countries – both members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – manage their disputes as part of broader efforts towards a full strategic partnership.
Soon after, the two nations held the 10th meeting of their high-level Joint Permanent Working Group on Maritime and Ocean Concerns in Vietnam, to better coordinate their South China Sea positions and explore cooperation, especially in maritime security.
By all indications, the two nations are bent on exploring a de facto alliance amid concerns over China’s expanding footprint in adjacent waters. But any substantive Philippines-Vietnam cooperation will have to contend with strategic and ideological misgivings, China’s economic primacy, and the ripple effects of intensified great power competition in the region.
Adversaries throughout the Cold War, with the Philippines hosting American bases crucial to US operations in Vietnam, Manila and Hanoi forged increasingly cordial ties throughout the 1990s. In particular, the Ramos administration supported communist Vietnam joining Asean, a bloc founded by mostly pro-Western regimes.
Philippine president Fidel Ramos (second left) greets Vietnamese president Le Duc Anh in his hotel room in Manila after presenting a cake to celebrate the latter’s 75th birthday, on December 1, 1995, during his state visit. Photo: AP
As key claimant states in the South China Sea, the two countries largely coordinated in establishing a regional maritime code of conduct, paving the way for the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between Asean and China. In the mid-2000s, bilateral ties reached a new phase when the Arroyo administration included Hanoi in a trilateral energy exploration deal with Beijing in the South China Sea.
The decisive moment in strategic relations, however, came in 2010, when Hanoi, as Asean chairman, sought greater American intervention in South China Sea disputes. This culminated in the Obama administration’s unprecedented announcement that it would treat freedom of navigation in the contested waters as a matter of “national interest”, paving the way for a bigger American naval presence in the area.
Under the Aquino administration, Manila started to pursue a “strategic partnership” with Hanoi amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea. Vietnamese and Filipino troops held sporting events in the contested Spratly Islands while diplomats worked on a potential joint arbitration case against China.
Amid growing Vietnamese naval deployments for goodwill visits to Manila, Aquino held high-level talks with his Vietnamese counterpart to solidify the alliance against China.
The alliance was quietly encouraged by the United States, which separately helped enhance the maritime security capabilities of both nations. But the election of Rodrigo Duterte, a populist who favoured stronger ties with Beijing and lashed out at Western allies, torpedoed the burgeoning alliance.
Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung (left) chats to Philippine president Benigno Aquino after their joint press statement at the Malacanang Palace on May 21, 2014. Photo: AFP
Worse, there was a violent clash between Vietnamese fishermen and the Philippine navy just a year into Duterte’s term. Over the next five years, Duterte largely snubbed his Vietnamese counterparts, who were surprised by the radical shift in Philippine foreign policy.
Since entering office, Marcos has tried to rekindle ties with Vietnam by recognising their shared strategic interests and unwillingness to rely solely on Western allies to counter China. Still, there are three main hurdles to a fully fledged Philippines-Vietnam alliance.
First, both sides have a degree of mistrust. Many in the Philippines, including in the diplomatic community, feel duped by Vietnam. When Manila initiated its South China Sea arbitration case against Beijing in 2013, Vietnamese interlocutors reportedly implied they would soon file a parallel case in support.
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Fishermen in South China Sea are at the centre of territorial crossfires
Fishermen in South China Sea are at the centre of territorial crossfires
When that didn’t happen, many Filipinos suspected that Hanoi was letting the Philippines take all the risk while sitting back to reap the arbitration benefits. Meanwhile, Hanoi, scarred by the radical shift in Philippine foreign policy, was concerned about the viability of a long-term partnership with a seemingly unreliable neighbour.
This brings us to the second issue: strategic and ideological differences. Although the Philippines has had an unstable foreign policy, its liberal democratic political system and Pentagon-trained defence establishment remain broadly aligned with the West. This is particularly crucial as the Biden administration’s democracy agenda has piqued Vietnam’s communist leadership, which openly fears a “colour revolution” agenda by the West.
Hanoi, which is again courting its communist brethren in Beijing, will have misgivings about fully aligning with Washington and/or its regional allies such as Manila. Also, Hanoi cannot afford to fully alienate Beijing, a top trading and investment partner.
Meanwhile, both nationalist and Beijing-friendly voices in the Philippines have increasingly zeroed in on Vietnam’s expansive footprint in the South China Sea, pointing to its reclamation and militarisation activities in contested waters. One prominent pro-Beijing Filipino commentator went as far as openly portraying Vietnam as the “more serious threat” in the South China Sea.
Finally, there are operational constraints to a robust alliance. The Philippines’ heavily US-armed military and Vietnam’s heavily Russian-armed military lack technological and operational compatibility. This could complicate any plans for large drills, arms transfers and closer military cooperation, even if the two nations decide to step up intelligence-sharing and diplomatic coordination in the South China Sea.
In short, a fully fledged Philippines-Vietnam alliance, while tantalising, is unlikely to happen soon.
Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific”, and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”
