Vietnam’s ideal position is strategic equidistance from the US and China

While Vietnam and the US played up their comprehensive partnership on Anthony Blinken’s visit to the Southeast Asian nation, Hanoi has not allied with the West against China
Vietnam’s preference is not only to refuse choosing between the US and China, but also to actively pursue strategic cooperation with middle powers

Richard Heydarian

Published: 1:00am, 24 Apr 2023

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“The United States is committed to supporting a strong, prosperous, independent, and resilient Vietnam,” declared US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his first visit to Vietnam since becoming America’s top diplomat. In Hanoi, the two sides celebrated the 10th anniversary of their comprehensive partnership, which ushered in an era of economic cooperation.

Two-way trade ballooned from US$450 million in 1995 to a whopping US$138 billion last year, with more than a quarter of Vietnam’s total exports heading to the US market alone.

However, with US President Joe Biden placing the promotion of democracy at the heart of his foreign policy, his top diplomat was careful to emphasise that “we continue to underscore how future progress on human rights is essential to unleashing the full potential of the Vietnamese people”. Although Blinken’s meetings with his Vietnamese counterparts were convivial, human rights issues have prevented a full blossoming of bilateral strategic ties.

Moreover, Hanoi has also refused to openly align with the West against its communist brethren to the north. If anything, Vietnam has recently doubled down on its efforts to rebuild frayed ties with China, a major trade partner as well a rival in the South China Sea.

By all indications, the Southeast Asian nation is determined to stick to a policy of “multi-alignment”, delicately maintaining robust ties with multiple powers without sacrificing Hanoi’s strategic autonomy in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.

There is a reason a cornerstone of contemporary Vietnam’s national security strategy are the “four noes”: no siding with one power against another; no hosting foreign military bases; no treaty-based military alliances with foreign powers; and no deployment of coercive force or threat of war as an instrument of foreign relations.

Throughout the mid-20th century, Hanoi grappled with a series of traumatic conflicts against major powers, beginning with colonial France and the US, but also with Maoist China, a former ally. Those destructive conflicts not only underscored the tragedy of war, but also the futility of alliances with foreign powers. Despite a mutual defence deal with the Soviet Union, for instance, Vietnam was left largely to its own devices towards the end of Cold War.

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By adopting the open-door Doi Moi (meaning “renovation”) policy in the late 1980s, the communist regime in Vietnam refocused its energies on building the domestic economy and improving the welfare of the people. But festering disputes in the South China Sea triggered a new round of tensions with China.

In response, Hanoi gradually courted warmer ties with the West, which, in turn, saw Vietnam as a valuable strategic partner in the world’s most dynamic region.

In 2008, Vietnam joined negotiations for the then US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) membership. Two years later, the US returned the favour by offering Vietnam a strategic partnership. At the end of the Obama administration, Washington completely lifted a 50-year-old ban on arms exports to Hanoi.

Three factors, however, prevented a full-fledged US-Vietnam alliance. The first was the election of Donald Trump as president, who openly threatened to abandon long-time treaty allies, underscoring uncertainty in the American foreign policy trajectory. Although Trump himself charmed Hanoi, which hosted his meeting with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2019, Vietnam couldn’t help questioning America’s reliability as an ally.

As for the Biden administration, it inadvertently reinforced Hanoi’s ambivalence by overtly embracing a “democracy promotion” agenda. In 2021, Biden snubbed Vietnam in his global Summit for Democracy in Washington, prompting the Southeast Asian nation to defend its “socialist democracy” in a public statement.

Meanwhile, the US Congress has repeatedly pressed Vietnam on human rights. Thus, despite the relaxation of arms controls against the communist nation, Washington is yet to clear major defence deals with Hanoi.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) meets with Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong at the Communist Party of Vietnam headquarters in Hanoi on April 15. Photo: AFP

The second major factor that is preventing a US-Vietnam alliance is the Vietnamese communist party’s decision to refocus on ties with China’s leadership to manage tensions related to border trade and maritime disputes.

Accordingly, Vietnam’s party chief, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first foreign leader to visit China and meet Chinese President Xi Jinping after his re-election last year. The meeting culminated in a series of deals, whereby the two countries agreed to boost a shared supply chain and effectively manage tensions in the South China Sea.

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The final factor is Vietnam’ instinct for strategic hedging whenever squeezed between multiple powers. As political scientist Cheng-Chwee Kuik explains, “hedging” is an “an insurance-seeking strategic behaviour” , which involves “not taking sides between the contending powers”. This often entails conscious pursuit of “multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high uncertainties and high stakes”.

No wonder then that Vietnam’s preference is not only to refuse choosing between the US and China, but also to actively pursue strategic cooperation with middle powers such as India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and countries in Europe. Until recently, Vietnam was a top buyer of arms and defence systems from Russia, a relatively minor player in East Asia.

Amid growing sanctions on the Russian defence industry, India and South Korea have become top suppliers of relatively affordable weapons systems. Meanwhile, Japan is also stepping up its defence exports, while helping to enhance Vietnam’s coastguard capabilities. On its part, the European Union has a defence partnership deal with Hanoi.

What makes middle powers an attractive partner is their tendency for no-strings-attached defence cooperation as well as the absence of direct territorial disputes with Vietnam.

By actively keeping its strategic options open, Vietnam can maintain an optimal equidistance from both the US and China.

Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific”, and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”