Why China should brace itself for a Pacific rebuff

Pacific island leaders have repeatedly expressed their reservations about being drawn into the power struggle between Beijing and Washington
With the US navy already having a foothold in the region, China needs much more than one base to gain military relevance in the South Pacific

Emanuele Scimia

Published: 1:30am, 24 Jun 2022

Why you can trust SCMP

Pacific island nations continue to send negative signals or buy time on China’s bid to strike a security pact with them. This suggests that a strategic debacle may be in the offing for China, which risks losing the opportunity to hit the United States in what seems to be its soft underbelly along the Pacific Rim.

On June 17, during an official visit to New Zealand, Samoan Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata’afa said South Pacific countries could deal with their own security affairs without the intervention of outside actors.

Just three days earlier, Mata’afa had pointed out that China’s proposal for a comprehensive security arrangement should be considered by the 18-strong Pacific Islands Forum. The regional organisation will convene on July 12-14, and Mata’afa’s call should sound the alarm for China.

Australia and New Zealand, two US allies worried by Chinese activism in what they consider their geopolitical backyard, are part of the forum. It also includes the Federated States of Micronesia, which loudly opposes the stipulation of a security deal with the Chinese while welcoming economic cooperation with them.

At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Fijian Defence Minister Inia Seruiratu bluntly emphasised that “machine guns, fighter jets … are not our primary security concern. The single greatest threat to our very existence is climate change”.

Having bases or extended rights of stopover and replenishment in the South Pacific would be a great strategic coup for China. If it were to succeed in establishing some sort of military presence in the region, it might attack US frontline troops and hardware along the first island chain from behind.

Visiting Samoan Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata’afa and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern are led onto Parliament’s forecourt by a Maori warrior during the official welcome in Wellington on June 14. Photo: NZ Herald

Furthermore, the lines of communication and resupply routes from US territory (Hawaii and San Diego) to Australia, Guam and possibly the Philippines and Taiwan, would become a possible target of Chinese advanced units in the South Pacific.

In that case, a US strategy to close China within the China seas, based on the use of small, mobile forces distributed around island chains, would be seriously called into question.

There is a caveat, however. China recently signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands, but the real contours of the agreement remain obscure. Many speculate that China could establish a naval outpost in the Pacific nation.

While the possible control of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base would give China an advantage in the southern section of the disputed South China Sea, the country needs much more than one base to gain military relevance in the South Pacific. It would need at least three or four, as recently underlined by Euan Graham, an Asia-Pacific security expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Aside from the Guam military complex, in the South Pacific the US military has facilities on the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Wake Island, which is a US territory. With the cooperation of Australia, Washington also plans to refurbish a naval base built during World War II on Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island. A new base in the Federated States of Micronesia is in the offing too, as well as a US$197 million tactical radar system in Palau.

The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt is moored pier side at the US’ naval base in Guam on May 15, 2020. Photo: US Navy/AFP

The US has another operational advantage in the South Pacific compared to China. Under the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) treaties with three Pacific island nations, US forces can freely conduct activities in the waters and airspace off these islands, and can also prevent military operations from other countries.

Faced with China’s geopolitical assertiveness in the region, the US government has now rushed to renew the COFA agreements with the Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands, which will expire in 2023, and with Palau, which come to an end in 2024.

China’s diplomatic offensive in the South Pacific is clearly a response to the US Indo-Pacific challenge, especially after the administration of US President Joe Biden fleshed out the Quad format with Japan, India and Australia, and launched the Aukus pact with Britain and Australia.

South Pacific leaders actually do not want to be dragged into a geopolitical confrontation between great powers. Along with their interest in tackling climate change and the rising of sea levels, economic recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic is their priority.

Ships are docked offshore in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, in November 2018. South Pacific leaders would rather focus on mitigating climate change and recovery from the pandemic, than be dragged into a geopolitical confrontation between great powers. Photo: AP

On June 16, Pacific Islands Forum secretary general Henry Puna noted that growing geostrategic competition “has catapulted the region to the centre of global attention.” In his view, the South Pacific has never had as much leverage and influence as it currently does.

Puna believes Pacific island nations should “maximise” their leverage. To reach this goal, they should take a page from the survival playbook of Southeast Asian countries, which are able to maintain a flexible diplomacy with respect to the US-China power struggle, so as to have some benefits.

Talking about his country at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Indonesia’s Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto summarised well the strategic orientation of China’s neighbours in Southeast Asia: “We respect all the big powers and all the powers that need to have their space, their rights respected. We support a rules-based international order because we are the most affected by any order that just relies on big powers.”

Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst