China has
urged restraint from all sides involved in the confrontation in the Gulf area, which is the minimum required for a great power, but has so far been unable (or unwilling) to leverage investments, loans, credit lines and inducements to influence regional dynamics.
Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia and Shiite Muslim Iran are arch-rivals in the Middle East, and this is a problem for China. Iran is a
strategic partner of China, and a beneficiary of belt and road funds, while Saudi Arabia is China’s
largest oil supplier. So, Beijing must walk a fine line between both countries in the tense scenario.
Investigations are ongoing, but there is
little doubt that Tehran is behind the strikes on the Saudi oil facilities, whether directly or indirectly. Iran had already raised the stakes in
June and
July with operations to seize foreign oil tankers crossing the Persian Gulf.
The US has responded by launching an international military coalition to escort commercial ships in the waters off Iran that now includes Britain,
Saudi Arabia, Australia and Bahrain.
Taming an increasingly bellicose Iran should also be a priority for Beijing, which has an interest in promoting stability in an area that has become a
focus of the belt and road initiative.
Further, much of China’s oil imports comes from the Gulf nations, so its economy would be damaged by the disruption of shipping through the sensitive Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
The crisis in the broader Persian Gulf region has mounted since last year when the US
walked away from the 2015 deal that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – and Germany – had signed with Iran to curb its nuclear programme.
US President Donald Trump’s “
maximum pressure” on Iran, including the reintroduction of economic sanctions, the imposition of new penalties and the deployment of troops and weaponry to Saudi Arabia, has contributed to exacerbating regional tensions.
But Iran is not the only destabilising force in the Gulf. The Saudi-led air campaign against Tehran-aligned Houthi rebels in
Yemen has worsened an already devastating situation in this war-torn country.
Even in this case, China has not been able to persuade its Saudi and Iranian clients to find a compromise to settle the years-long conflict in Yemen.
It is evident that Beijing’s diplomatic footprint in the Middle East is still weak. For instance, Chinese diplomacy was
important, but not decisive, in the finalisation of the Iran nuclear agreement.
Meanwhile, China remains a marginal actor in the peace negotiations for
Syria, another proxy battlefield between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
China’s foreign ministry said on September 13 that Beijing was ready to “actively contribute” to the Astana peace talks, the process that Russia, Turkey and Iran
created to resolve the Syrian crisis. However, it would participate only as an observer country along with Egypt, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates.
The belt and road initiative is a long-term endeavour, and recent events show it has not yet reached its geopolitical potential. After all, belt and road investments have shrunk this year, to US$38.8 billion – they were worth US$125.5 billion last year, according to the China Global Investment Tracker.
In addition, the Chinese often have
problems implementing their overseas development projects. China National Petroleum Corp’s decision to halt a major investment in Iran’s South Pars gas field illustrates this reality.
It seems that China is only able to orient the political direction of small and weak belt and road partners such as Sri Lanka, Tajikistan or, to a certain extent, the Philippines. To influence the policies of regional powers such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, the New Silk Roads must be supported by both a military presence and diplomatic activism.
The display of
military muscle in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, with the deployment of one of its more capable warships (the Type 052D guided-missile destroyer) in an anti-piracy mission, is a sign of China’s growing engagement in the Middle East.
China also reportedly claimed in August that it would consider escorting its commercial ships should the Gulf waters become unsafe, and was studying the US proposal for a multinational coalition to protect shipping in the region.
But the Chinese need a surplus of diplomatic involvement, perhaps with the help of Europe, to have their say on Middle Eastern affairs.
Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst
