In return, the US will declare the end of Korean war, approve Chinese and South Korean aid to North Korea, and relax or lift sanctions.

Assuming that reports of the above-mentioned plan are true, the US seems to be retreating from its earlier position on denuclearisation.

However, this would break the current deadlock over denuclearisation: the US keeps the basic requirement that North Korea abandon nuclear weapons, while the North gets more room for manoeuvre.

Some experts do not even think a second summit is necessary. A deep-rooted recognition here is that the nuclear arsenal is the regime’s most important piece of defence against foreign aggression; Kim would never really abandon nuclear weapons, so the gesture he is making towards denuclearisation is just a show he is putting on under pressure from the outside world.

Such a point of view is not unreasonable. But the situation has come to a head. Neither Trump nor Kim can drag his feet over denuclearisation any longer, and it is time to produce visible results.

Trump is in the second half of his presidential term. Around the middle of next year, he will start to prepare for his re-election. If he wants to win, he needs to present a shining record of achievement.

Given that the Democrats are taking control of the House, putting up barriers to his decisions and confronting him about Russian interference in the 2016 election, Trump is unlikely to accomplish much on the domestic front.

Last year’s summit gave Trump a formal breakthrough. After all, no other US president had negotiated face to face with a North Korean leader. However, considering the current stalemate, that summit has not had much significance beyond the meeting itself.

It has done little for the US, and nearly nothing to change the situation in northeast Asia. If Trump means to leave a foreign affairs legacy, he is at a critical moment now. He has to push North Korea further and show the world that Pyongyang is really abandoning nuclear weapons.

Kim, on the other hand, faces multiple difficulties: international sanctions, economic hardship at home, and the possibility of military interference if the denuclearisation process drags on.

In the past year, even though he has improved ties with China and South Korea, he has failed to get the US to relax its sanctions against the North.

The relaxing or lifting of the sanctions is the key to developing North Korea’s economy. Given the weakness of the economy, although Kim has tried to pursue limited reforms, five or 10 more years of sanctions could be disastrous for the regime.

And if North Korea continues to disappoint Trump and the US, the US might consider a military option. Once this happens, even if the US does not actually send armed forces to North Korea, the threat of military action would put great pressure on Kim and the North.

In the past, North Korea would expect to have been able to rely on China. However, although Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang has warmed considerably following a recent chill, and the two countries have almost returned to their “blood alliance”, Xi Jinping still has not visited North Korea.

China seems wary of letting North Korea rely on it, and as long as Beijing does not thoroughly fall out with Washington, it will not wholeheartedly support Pyongyang.

China is displeased with North Korea for pursuing a nuclear programme against Chinese advice and endangering Chinese interests. From this perspective, although China will not take the initiative and exert pressure on North Korea, it is quite happy for the US to disarm the North.

Some believe that Xi could play the North Korea card in the trade war with the US, but this is impossible. It is more likely that the two issues will be dealt with separately, according to their own logic and importance.

Clearly, the disarmament of North Korea is imminent. After the contest of wills last year, Trump should understand the complexity of the denuclearisation process.

As for Kim, when he agreed to hold the second summit, it meant that he was ready to disarm completely. It is easy to cheat once, but not twice. He could make excuses for not disarming after the first summit, but the consequences will be serious if he tries it again. So we can be optimistic about the second Trump-Kim summit.

Deng Yuwen is an independent scholar and a researcher at the China Strategic Analysis Centre Inc. This article was translated from Chinese.