The relationship between Moscow is growing stronger, but the two countries have vastly different approaches to securing their strategic interests. Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Alessandro Arduino
Alessandro Arduino
China’s vague stance on Russia’s Ukraine attack contrary to its core interest
Beijing prefers a peaceful solution to Ukraine crisis, but must walk a political tightrope by managing its relations between Russia and the US
The Beijing-Moscow relationship has improved thanks to a lack of unity in the West
As Russia launches action against Ukraine and most of the world rallies around Kyiv, the limits of China’s new, more muscular, foreign policy have grown more apparent.
Ukraine poses a compelling question for Beijing: How to manage relations between Russia and the United States as a new era of great power rivalry ramps up. While Russia is masterful at creating – and taking advantage of – tensions, Beijing’s tendency is to be passive. Last weekend, at the 58th Munich Security Conference, Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi said the security of one country should not be achieved at the expense of others, and that regional security should not be based on strengthening blocs.
The Ukraine crisis has thus become a litmus test for what the Chinese media outlet Global Times described as an unprecedented China-Russia relationship to start a new era of international relations that is not defined by the US.
Russian armoured vehicles at the railway station in Rostov region, Russia, 23 February 2022. Photo: EPA-EFE
Both have increased their economic cooperation, with overlapping alignments on international issues. But Beijing craves stability for its brand of “win-win” economic diplomacy and benefits from the international order, even though it is bent on inexorably shaping it more to its liking. While China is reforming the People’s Liberation Army, this is still a work in progress – in any case, it is doubtful Beijing will be able, or willing, to add the stick to its basket of carrots.
Russia’s iron fist thrives on chaos. It is using brute force to impose its vision of a new European security order. It has used private companies to gain a foothold in areas from Syria to Mali. Moscow cannot afford to add economic diplomacy to its strategic toolbox – its economy is minuscule, relatively speaking.
What happened in Kazakhstan last month revealed China’s fundamentally different approach to Russia in securing its strategic interests. Beijing was forced to look on – and lend grudging support – to armed intervention by the Russian-led Collective Security Treat Organisation (CSTO) in a country that sits on its border, and which is a linchpin of its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
This by no means suggests that their differing approaches will raise friction. The Sino-Russia relationship has evolved from symbiotic distrust since the 1990s to a comprehensive strategic partnership. What’s fuelling it is the ongoing search for a new global security architecture. The US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, Russia-Nato rivalry, and Turkish adventurism in the Middle East all showcase the need for regional conflict resolution. The lack of unity in the West and Washington’s shift in geostrategic priorities has accelerated the alignment between Moscow and Beijing.
Still, Ukraine is where the rubber meets the road. Kyiv is a major trading partner for China. Worse, President Vladimir Putin’s dismissal of the Minsk Agreement in moving troops into self-declared separatist states in eastern Ukraine shrinks Beijing’s manoeuvre space.
China now has limited options. Hedging is necessary in its view. Beijing is acutely aware that a misstep over Ukraine could result in significant damage to its relationship with the European Union, and further strain ties with the US. Worse, as more countries condemn Putin’s actions, the threat that such nations will align more closely with the West is growing, putting distance between them and China.
A Ukrainian serviceman fires an NLAW anti-tank weapon during an exercise in the Joint Forces Operation, in the Donetsk region, eastern Ukraine, on February 15, 2022. Photo: AP
After a call with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this week, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterated Wang Yi’s admonition to “resolve differences through dialogue and negotiation”. That is about all it can do to avoid antagonising its new partner.
On Thursday morning, China’s envoy to the United Nations said Beijing believed the door to a peaceful solution to the Ukraine issue had not been shut, and should not be shut.
On the surface, the deliberately vague Chinese position is akin to that of several other countries, notably India and Israel. However, those countries have core interests in mind in adopting this stance. Russia is a long-time partner of India, and its major weapons supplier. At a time when India faces problems of its own with China, it cannot afford to antagonise Moscow. Israel faces dangers next door, and will need Russian help to deconflict operations in Syria.
China, on the other hand, is taking a position contrary to its core interest: Stability to back up its economic diplomacy. A Europe aflame does not help China in the least. The danger is that China will find itself stuck in the last place it wants to be – on a boat with a revisionist autocrat who might start the biggest war in Europe since 1945, and with fewer friends than ever.
Dr Alessandro Arduino, the Principal Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, previously served in China with the Italian Foreign Ministry and in academia for over two decades.
