Why China prefers diplomacy to military pressure in the Middle East
Beijing’s top priorities are unification with Taiwan, national unity and defending its claims over disputed continental and maritime regions
As long as its interests in the Middle East aren’t directly threatened, there is little reason to pursue military influence or join US-led security efforts
The United States is reportedly considering deploying two more aircraft carriers to its western Pacific fleet, which already consists of three carriers. These potential deployments, along with recent naval exercises involving Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea and the expected visit of US senators to Taiwan this week, underline Washington’s dedication to prioritising its strategic interests in the region.
This commitment persists even as the US remains involved in safeguarding commercial ships in the Red Sea amid tensions with Yemen’s Houthis. These developments are happening on the back of a recent meeting between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, aimed at establishing guard rails on bilateral relations.
The top issues that the Chinese readout of the meeting mentioned were Taiwan and Washington’s alleged politicisation of economic issues for national security – in other words, restrictions on the export of advanced technology to China.
The security issue in the Middle East was mentioned tangentially with a reference to global and regional issues in places including Ukraine, Myanmar, the Korean peninsula and South China Sea. The statements from the two sides did not even refer to the Red Sea crisis, including the Houthi attacks on commercial vessels or the recent killings of US soldiers in Jordan.
These interactions highlight that the Middle East security issue is not a top agenda item for US-China talks, yet other reports suggest Washington has reached out to Beijing asking it to influence Iran in restraining its proxy militia activities in the region.
Iran-backed Houthis have been targeting commercial vessels in and around the Red Sea, disrupting maritime trade and increasing shipping costs, including for China. In response, Beijing has criticised the harassment and attacks on civilian vessels, as well as the disruption of supply chains and the global trading regime, without specifying the responsible party.
There is no evidence to suggest Beijing made these calls in response to US requests. Beijing’s reported discussions with Tehran on this issue have been specific on the potential attacks on Chinese vessels and its adverse effects for bilateral business ties.
Some analysts have claimed China is freeloading on US-provided security in the region, is being risk-averse or lacks the political clout to shape outcomes in the Middle East, and is prioritising geopolitics over addressing regional security concerns. Such claims, however, fail to provide a compelling account of Beijing’s military strategy and diplomatic approach in the region.
For starters, Beijing’s top priorities are unification with Taiwan, national unity, and defending its claims over disputed continental and maritime regions. Additionally, safeguarding Chinese people, businesses and investments along its maritime superhighway – extending from coastal China through the South China Sea and Malacca Strait to the Arabian Sea and East African coast – is a key concern.
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US-led coalition strikes Iran-backed Houthi fighters in Yemen
US-led coalition strikes Iran-backed Houthi fighters in Yemen
China’s military is primarily committed to protecting these interests and asserting sovereignty and control over the disputed regions. If there is any chance of military confrontation with another country, it would be likely to occur along the disputed land border in the Himalayas or maritime regions in the South and East China seas.
The western Pacific is a region where China is largely devoted to trying to deny the United States any military advantage. In conflicts with neighbouring countries, China describes the US as an outsider and accuses it of unwarranted interference. It also claims other regional countries’ assertiveness is a result of US influence.
In addition, China has condemned US support of Israel in the Gaza war and its recent strikes against Iran-backed groups. Beijing strongly opposes Israel’s actions against Palestinians and seeks a ceasefire and a two-state solution under the banner of its stated commitment to peace.
That helps explain China’s lack of military presence in other regions as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Fudan University professor Chuchu Zhang and Sujata Ashwarya, an assistant professor at India’s Jamia Millia Islamia, note China’s perception of the Middle East as a high-risk region. So, instead of assuming a security role like that of the US, China calls on regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to unite and address the Palestinian issue.
This underscores a crucial reason for China’s non-involvement in the Red Sea conflict with the Houthis. Beijing does not worry that doing so would buttress the US position or look like it was bowing to US influence. Rather, it stems from the recognition that such involvement would fail to address the underlying causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or further China’s regional interests.
While the Houthi attacks have not had as large an impact on Chinese interests in the region, China has cautioned Iran of potential repercussions to their business relations should such attacks occur. Contrary to popular belief, Beijing has significant influence over Tehran, given that crude imports from Iran constitute just 10 per cent of China’s overall energy imports but represent 90 per cent of Iran’s crude exports.
Tehran cannot afford to jeopardise its ties with Beijing, especially as China deepens its connections throughout the Middle East. If China can safeguard its people, businesses and investments in the region through diplomatic channels, there is little reason to pursue military pressure against Iran or its proxies, particularly as their primary focus is countering US influence in the region.
Finally, the Middle East arguably holds no direct link to China’s core interests or feature prominently in the daily lives of average Chinese citizens. Public sentiment in China isn’t significantly swayed by Middle East crises in the same manner as relations with other regional countries or major powers. Beijing’s stance towards other nations is thus viewed as a necessary means to bolster nationalism.
Riaz Khokhar is an MA political science candidate at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden
