In the autumn of 1949, two months after Mao Zedong formed the People’s Republic of China, he made his first major overseas visit, to Russia. Arriving in Moscow, Mao expected a warm welcome as a fellow communist leader, equal to his host, Joseph Stalin. That was not to be.
The two wary communists viewed each other with suspicion. Stalin had originally backed Chiang Kai-shek; then, when the nationalists began losing, he switched to support Mao. Although Stalin saw Mao as weak, he also viewed him as a competitor for the position of leader of global communism. Stalin made his view of Mao as an underling very clear.
But China’s leaders play a long game, and the tables would turn. The dynamics of geopolitical, economic and strategic power are now decisively in China’s favour and Russia is the supplicant, its president and the nation shaken by a failed coup orchestrated by Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group mercenaries on June 24.
Subsequent attempts to show that President Vladimir Putin remains fully in control only underscore his weakness and illuminate troubles within the Russian military command.
Today, Chinese President Xi Jinping holds the upper hand with Russia, economically and diplomatically.
Xi has chosen to throw his political and economic weight behind Russia. He has sent clear messages of support since February 2022, when the Ukraine war began. Indeed, his first post-pandemic foreign visit in March this year was to Moscow, where he and Putin committed to deepening the alliance between the two countries.
But glad-handing and photo ops cannot hide the reality of a deeply unequal relationship.
Putin is in a very weak position. The Ukraine war, far from being a decisive, swift, low-cost knockout, is draining the country. Estimates suggest it has cost Russia between 47,000 and 200,000 casualties, depending on the data source. Russia is depleting its military stockpiles, even as oil and trade sanctions are shrinking Moscow’s economic options.
The Russian economy is an ageing operation of fossil fuels, metals and other commodities that has been hit hard by economic isolation from the West. Russia’s economy is a fraction of China’s at a mere US$2 trillion. With Russia and its businesses ring-fenced with sanctions by the United States and European Union, the economy is expected to barely grow this year. Russian exports to Europe are down by about 40 per cent compared to pre-war, in major markets like Germany and the Netherlands.
China’s economy, even when stressed, as now, remains the second largest in the world after the US, at US$18.1 trillion last year. It is massive, diverse, deep, innovative, globally interconnected, flexible and a direct competitor with the US. Russia’s economy mattered little globally before the war; now, with Europe weaning itself off Russian gas, it matters even less to the West.
The unequal alliance between Russia and China has Xi paying many of Russia’s bills, via commodity and fossil fuel imports worth an estimated US$88 billion in the wake of the war. This increasing trade flow is not a sign of Russian strength but of weakness.
02:46
Russian prime minister travels to China to ‘elevate cooperation’
Russian prime minister travels to China to ‘elevate cooperation’
Putin is Xi’s inferior and now is the time for China to exert influence. Russia is desperate for a muscular economic backer and Putin needs China as a buyer for its (heavily discounted) oil and gas; it needs Chinese goods and technology as Western markets remain closed; it wants, but has not yet secured, supplies of Chinese military armaments.
Xi may be backing Russia in its war against Ukraine, but he calls the shots in this relationship and is getting the better deal out of the alliance. He should use his influence with Putin to push him to the negotiating table with Ukraine. Not today, but certainly after Ukraine’s counteroffensive.
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China is ‘big winner’ in Ukraine-Russia war, says leading US political scientist
China is ‘big winner’ in Ukraine-Russia war, says leading US political scientist
China can set the stage for a deal by using its 12-point peace plan as a framework for a return to peace. To do that, it needs to convert the platitudes into a workable deal (or at least an outline) which would be subject to much haggling.
Xi has shown his ability to surprise diplomatically with the March 10 deal brokered between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He has also shown a willingness to act in Russia’s sphere of influence, staging a Central Asian summit with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – leaving out Russia – in late May, coinciding with the G7 summit.
If Xi can act as a pivotal player in crafting an exit from the war, China’s geopolitical stock will rise further. There may then be room for additional dialogue and a possible rapprochement between the two great powers of China and the US.
It is not beyond Xi’s reach to be the peacemaker. More than anyone, he can bring Putin to the table. Xi has spoken to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. When the smoke of the current offensive clears, Xi should begin brokering a way forward for the two enemies in earnest.
China can show it is equal to the US via action on Ukraine and using its position of power vis-à-vis Russia to help secure a lasting peace.
William R. Rhodesis president and CEO of William R. Rhodes Global Advisors, and author of Banker to the World.
Stuart P.M. Mackintoshis executive director of the Group of Thirty
