Members of the Wagner group stand on the balcony of the circus building in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, on June 24. Yevgeny Prigozhin, commander of the mercenary group, had ordered his troops to march on Moscow but abruptly reached a deal with the Kremlin to go into exile and sounded the retreat on June 25. Photo: AFP
Opinion
Andrew Hammond
Andrew Hammond
Wagner mutiny highlights Putin’s weakness, but outcome of Ukraine war remains unpredictable
If Putin remains in power and the Russian war effort continues apace, a war of attrition looks likely, although there is a slim but significant window of opportunity for peace talks as casualties rise
However, the worst-case scenario of further escalation of violence has not been closed off
As the Ukraine war nears its 500th day, the key issue on the minds of international policymakers is what impact the extraordinary recent mutiny of the Wagner mercenary group will have on the conflict.
The uprising, which exposed the growing internal fissures within the country, will do nothing to strengthen Russia’s already faltering war efforts. Yet its wider impact, including for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power, will not be fully clear for weeks to come. This despite some instant assessments – including that of former Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov – that this is the “beginning of the end”.
Putin’s political longevity has been remarkable in the last quarter of a century. While he is clearly down and badly weakened, he cannot yet be counted out.
One factor that will assist Putin is support from foreign countries, including staunch partners such as China and other friendly nations such as Turkey. China’s foreign ministry said on June 25 that the country supported Russia in “protecting national stability”. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko that day.
The Wagner mutiny comes at a time when the initiative in the war was already very much with Ukraine as it moved forward with its counteroffensive. Kyiv will hope it can make even bigger gains than it had previously hoped for if disarray sets in more widely among pro-Moscow forces.
If Putin remains in power, which seems most likely for the foreseeable future, and the Russian war effort continues apace, the most likely scenario remains the conflict following the trajectory of a war of attrition, albeit with significant twists and turns. This seems especially likely while both sides are still prepared to expend massive resources.
Some Western intelligence sources estimate that more than 200,000 Russian soldiers have already died on the battlefield, one of the chief gripes of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. This illustrates the terrible human price Putin is prepared to have his nation pay in pursuit of his war objectives. Meanwhile, the West has committed vast sums to Ukraine in aid and military support.
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Russia revolt ends in Wagner leader’s exile but leaves questions about Putin’s authority
Russia revolt ends in Wagner leader’s exile but leaves questions about Putin’s authority
Historically, wars tend to end when one side imposes its will on the other on the battlefield and then at the negotiating table, or when both sides embrace a compromise they deem preferable to fighting. While one of these outcomes could emerge – for instance, if the Ukrainian counteroffensive makes spectacular gains or the Putin regime implodes – this appeared highly uncertain at the time of writing amid fast-moving events in late June.
While a continued war of attrition could imply a degree of stability in the conflict, the events of recent days show this is not true and the level and range of risks actually remain exceptionally high. This is why the outcome remains so unpredictable, a factor not helped by Russia’s reckless sabre-rattling around its potential use of nuclear weaponry and disregard for nuclear power sites.
Pessimistic as this prospect of a continued war of attrition might seem, with the human cost – including for millions of refugees – largest of all, there are at least two other plausible outcomes. First, there could be a slim but significant window of opportunity for peace talks opening up, especially with heavier casualties taken by each side.
Although neither Moscow nor Kyiv is showing strong signs of wanting to negotiate, this could change. On Ukraine’s side, for instance, if its much-anticipated counteroffensive yields little fruit, pressure could grow to explore a peace deal. There would be a great deal of opposition to this, of course, but a pathway could be found.
For instance, key Western leaders could highlight to Ukraine that, during the Cold War, the US-led alliance did not recognise Soviet control of the three Baltic states. Ultimately, these countries emerged free and democratic after the end of the Cold War. The potential parallel with those parts of Ukraine now occupied by pro-Moscow forces could be strengthened with generous Western construction assistance and security guarantees for Kyiv.
A peace deal could also have growing utility for Russia and Putin – should he remain in power – as he fashions his political strategy for potential re-election in next spring’s presidential election. Putin could seek to argue, despite the manifest failures of Moscow’s military campaign, that Russia’s mission has been accomplished with the seizure of significant slices of Ukrainian territory.
Another factor that could increase prospects for peace is the growing interest of China in the conflict. President Xi Jinping, who has already set out a vague peace plan, has the most influence within Russia of any world leader.
A woman stands next to cardboard cut-outs of Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) and President Xi Jinping in Moscow on June 14. Photo: AFP
However, Putin’s growing weakness also raises the worst-case scenario of further escalation of violence. If he chooses to raise the stakes, the conflict could even escalate beyond Ukraine to involve Nato countries.
While this still seems unlikely to many, it cannot be dismissed given the volatility of the situation. The transatlantic alliance is doing what it can to support Ukraine without getting itself entangled in direct military confrontation, but miscalculation is a real concern.
Such an outcome is still not the central scenario, though. While Putin remains in power, the most likely outcome is that a war of attrition grinds on.
Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics
