How demilitarisation can ensure peace and stability in the South China Sea

China and Asean claimants could draw inspiration from the four-point formula Pakistan used to try to resolve its Kashmir stalemate with India
This would involve agreeing on shared sovereignty and joint economic development, with a binding code of conduct the goal, and eventual settlement of disputes an added bonus

Riaz Khokhar

Published: 3:30am, 13 Apr 2023

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China has renewed its push to settle a code of conduct with Asean in the South China Sea, days after it said it was willing to pledge allegiance to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. In particular, the Chinese state-backed Global Times stressed that the code of conduct should focus on crisis management rather than dispute resolution. These proposals may seem questionable but they could pave the way for improved security and stability in the South China Sea.

As it stands, the long-running disputes in the South China Sea benefit China, allowing it to flex its military muscle and show its assertiveness whenever any member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has a policy clash with Beijing or strengthens security ties with the United States.

Just as China-India border tensions led to the fatal Galwan Valley skirmish – triggered by infrastructure investments in the disputed border area and not helped by India’s strategic partnership with the US – such eruptions could unfold in the South China Sea if territorial disputes are merely subject to crisis management, instead of a long-term solution.

Southeast Asian countries have long faced Chinese harassment due to their fishing and energy exploration in the disputed South China Sea. Beijing is expected to object to the Indonesia-Vietnam agreement to demarcate their boundaries in their exclusive economic zones, which could undermine its interests, and has raised concerns about Malaysia’s gas exploration activities in areas it also claims.

If these disputes are resolved without China’s input, Beijing would be left with economic and diplomatic coercion, which would only draw more media attention and further strain relations. For example, China’s economic boycott of Australia and diplomatic squabble with Estonia during the Covid-19 pandemic led to a strong collective resistance and hardening of anti-Beijing discourse from Canberra to Brussels.

Still, the proposal to consider the code of conduct as a mechanism for crisis management in the South China Sea could be a stepping stone to peace.

Inspiration could be drawn from the four-point formula put forward by then Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf in 2006 to try to resolve the Kashmir stalemate with India. This called for demilitarisation, self-governance, no border changes and joint supervision. These ideas could be modified to suit the South China Sea.

The involved nations could agree on shared sovereignty and the joint development of economic zones in the disputed waters – therefore acknowledging sovereignty claims and addressing historical grievances. Joint patrols, fishing agreements and energy exploration deals could also be negotiated to reduce tensions, increase cooperation and build confidence.

A conclusive and binding code of conduct should be the goal, with the eventual settlement of disputes an added bonus.

01:50

Chinese military ship accused of shining laser light at Philippine coastguard vessel

Demilitarisation would also tie in nicely with Asean’s wish for the region to be free of nuclear weapons, embodied in its Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone treaty, also known as the Bangkok Treaty.

But Beijing’s commitment is insufficient and Taiwan is not the only flashpoint near by – there is also North Korea. As tensions rise on the Korean peninsula, South Korea has floated the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons while Japan briefly debated the idea of hosting US nuclear weapons.

The US, another nuclear-armed power, also seeks to work with its Indo-Pacific allies to deter nuclear strikes from China and North Korea. America has been strengthening its regional presence, acquiring access to four more military bases in the Philippines, adding a military base in Guam and supplying Australia with nuclear-powered submarines under the Aukus pact.

Southeast Asian countries may well view a strategic partnership with the US and Japan (and possibly Australia) as a counterbalance to China’s military assertiveness.

Against this backdrop, it would be unrealistic to expect the US to agree to the Bangkok Treaty or any proposal that excludes the option to use nuclear weapons in the region. Instead, the US, China and other major military powers could consider reduced militarisation in the South China Sea as a pragmatic option.

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If the US were to gain greater access to military facilities in Southeast Asia around the South China Sea for potential operations against China, it would only provide a pretext for Beijing to increase its military mobilisation against countries in the region.

Therefore, Asean should build a consensus and make a joint statement with a view to reducing the number of American and Chinese military and naval operations in the neighbourhood, cut back on the allocation of military bases to the US, and place restrictions on the deployment of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines during peacetime.

Reduced militarisation in the South China Sea could be monitored or enforced by an international body, such as the International Criminal Court, and in accordance with the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Beijing should also respect international law in the South China Sea and the territorial sovereignty of its neighbours.

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PLA scrambles fighter jets after detecting foreign warplanes over South China Sea

Effective implementation of these measures would necessitate significant diplomatic cooperation, compromise and a delicate balancing of interests among regional countries and major powers.

Fortunately, there is evidence that China is willing to compromise on its sovereign claims. In 1952, as a demonstration of its friendship with Vietnam, Beijing removed two “dashes” from its claimed waterways, cutting it down to the “nine-dash line”. If Asean can compromise by allowing less militarisation or military involvement with the US, Beijing could be convinced to remove more dashes.

Without compromise, any solution to the South China Sea disputes and an end to the region’s security tensions look elusive. Something has to give.

Riaz Khokhar is a policy associate at the Center for Regional and Global Connectivity at Tabadlab, Islamabad