Ukraine war: time to take Global South and its diverse views seriously

Focusing only on the combatants, Europe, Nato and China in any discussion on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine risks ignoring large parts of the world
Attitudes towards the war are complex and varied among nations in the Global South, and they should be part of the global conversation

Brian Y. S. Wong

Published: 3:30am, 17 Mar 2023

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There is more to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine than just Russia, Ukraine, the European Union, Nato and China. This statement might seem somewhat controversial – after all, these five actors, especially the first two, are capable of wielding the greatest leverage over the unfolding events.

Yet by focusing the discussion on their preferences and policies, the risk is that large parts of the world are ignored. Not only does the Global South – which includes developing countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania that have tended to be excluded from global institutions and organisations – have skin in the game, these nations also possess varying degrees of agency in relation to the war.

This gives rise to a vast diversity in their positions, which renders the neglect towards them in mainstream discourse such a fundamental mistake.

There are two competing characterisations of the Global South’s reaction to the war. The first narrative portrays the countries as largely in quiet admiration of Ukraine’s willingness to stand up to Russia’s bullying and sharing Ukraine’s concerns over the territorial violations by Russia. Regimes that buck the trend are seen as under the influence of those aligned with the Kremlin.

The second narrative takes a diametrically opposed stance. It suggests that countries in the Global South harbour sympathies for Russia and are fed up with the West. Citing the close ties between BRICS nations in energy, trade, finance and beyond, this view posits that countries in the Global South tend to side with whoever is willing to defy Western hegemony; in this case, Russia.

Both narratives have their appeal to loyal audiences in search of confirmation of their pre-existing world views. Those who view Russian expansionism and imperialism as a cause for concern are likely to subscribe to the first view. Those wary of decades of Western invasions in the name of human rights are likely to find the latter view more compelling. The truth, of course, is more complicated.

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On February 23, 141 member states adopted a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for an end to the war in Ukraine. Seven states voted against, with 32 abstaining. The resolution affirmed the demand that Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces” from Ukraine. Among those in favour were Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, the Philippines and Mexico.

Concerns are growing among some in the Global South that the invasion has caused more than just substantial disruptions to global food and energy supply chains, thus compounding pre-existing inflationary pressures. Singaporean scholar Lynn Kuok notes, for example, that the war constitutes a flagrant violation of international law, a sentiment shared by many in foreign policy circles in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

More fundamentally, the unfolding events serve as a clear warning to Russia’s neighbours, who are growing increasingly uneasy in the face of surging expansionist nationalism in Moscow. Central Asian states, led by Kazakhstan, are putting distance between themselves and Moscow’s rhetoric and actions amid concerns that Russia could seek retrenchment in the region next.

Countries in central and western Asia, as well as eastern Europe, are hedging by exploring closer ties with alternative partners, including the European Union and China. However, this is not to say that the Global South is antagonistic towards Russia. Some nations are disillusioned with what they see as Western opportunism over Ukraine.

Where, for example, was the outrage following the invasion of Iraq or amid the civil strife in Afghanistan and Syria, which morphed into hotbeds of violence and insurgency? In the eyes of some developing countries, these questions cast doubt on Western attempts to claim the moral high ground.

Talk of an “international rules-based order” might appeal to Western audiences, but it fails to resonate with those who have experienced violations of their own rights to self-determination.

More fundamentally, larger states in the Global South such as India and Indonesia are keen to maintain relations with both Russia and the West out of self-interest. India is a top Russian security and energy partner while also being increasingly strategically and economically aligned with the West. A 2022 survey found that almost 50 per cent of Indonesians favoured maintaining economic ties with Russia – the second-highest of the 52 countries surveyed.

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South Africa recently conducted joint naval exercises with Russia as it also pursues deeper economic ties with China and the US. Few countries are willing to choose sides; doing so is neither aligned with their people’s interests nor feasible, given pre-existing connections with both Russia and the West.

Some may find nations’ ambivalence frustrating, even immoral. Yet such sentiments should not deter from the fact that attitudes towards the war in Ukraine are complex and varied in the Global South. International affairs experts should at the very least acknowledge nations’ strategic autonomy and the full range of opinions.

Some countries may be more inclined to distance themselves from Russia as the war grinds on. Others might be drawn into Moscow’s economic orbit amid frustrations and grievances over Western rhetoric.

Whether it is Nato, the EU, Russia or China, they should not treat the Global South as a monolith. It is time to take their diversity of views seriously.

Brian Wong is a DPhil in Politics candidate at Balliol College and teaches politics at the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar (Hong Kong 2020)