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Opinion
Richard Heydarian
Richard Heydarian
Japan’s military build-up driven by fears over China’s rise and doubts about US alliance
- Japan’s moves reflect decades-long efforts to be more self-reliant amid growing concerns over China’s rise and the reliability of the US as an ally
- Given Japan’s past, though, ramping up its military spending risks sparking fears among its neighbours and ruining decades of building up soft power
“Japan’s path as a peaceful nation will remain unchanged,” Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said shortly after approving a landmark defence document which sets the country on a new strategic path. Saying the world is “at a historical crossroads”, Kishida hailed the recently released national security strategy as “a major shift from the postwar security policy” in favour of a more activist role in regional and global affairs.
Accordingly, the Japanese government has approved a five-year defence spending plan worth 43 trillion yen (US$329 billion), doubling the country’s annual defence spending as a share of gross domestic product to 2 per cent by 2027.
The controversial move – which some claim contradicts the country’s pacifist constitution – has been broadly popular, with a recent survey showing 51 per cent approval by the public.
Following this shake-up in his country’s defence policy, Kishida embarked on a five-nation tour this month as he sought to rally support from a host of Western allies. During his visit to Washington, he made it clear China is at the heart of his country’s new defence strategy by declaring, “It is absolutely imperative for Japan, the United States and Europe to stand united in managing our respective relationship with China.”
Far from an abrupt policy shift, Kishida’s latest moves reflect decades-long efforts to make Japan a more capable, self-reliant power amid growing concerns not only over China’s rise but also the reliability of the US as an ally. But given Japan’s imperial past, any military build-up is bound to trigger strategic trepidation among some neighbouring states.
For the past seven decades, Japan has been bound by a pacifist constitution which proscribes the nation from offensive projection of military power. In particular, Article 9 makes it clear that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”.
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Marking 77 years since end of WWII, Japanese leader says nation will never again wage war
Marking 77 years since end of WWII, Japanese leader says nation will never again wage war
To hedge against Cold War uncertainties, however, Japan established the Self-Defence Forces which were barred from partaking in offensive missions overseas. To regain the trust of its neighbours, Japan also embarked on a charm offensive following its swift economic recovery in the 1950s and 1960s. The upshot was the establishment of the Asian Development Bank in Manila as well as a host of bilateral trade, aid and investment initiatives, which accelerated industrialisation across East Asia.
Under the “Fukuda Doctrine”, Japan further deepened its strategic cooperation with and diplomatic support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the 1970s. Japan’s remarkable economic transformation, appealing popular culture and large-scale official development assistance to poorer neighbours further enhanced the country’s soft power in the succeeding decades.
The upshot was the emergence of Japan as a largely benign power in the eyes of many neighbouring states, especially in Southeast Asia, even as its history continued to embitter bilateral relations with South Korea and China. Three interrelated factors, however, have steadily reshaped Japan’s post-war strategic orientation.
To begin with, Japan has yet to come to terms with its past. There was never any reckoning similar to post-war Germany, which unequivocally apologised for and systematically purged its militarist legacy. Many top Japanese leaders have made visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where more than a dozen Imperial Japanese generals and top officials are memorialised.
The upshot was a distinct form of historical revisionism which also fuelled a desire for a more independent Japan. In particular, the late prime minister Shinzo Abe played a crucial role in gradually recasting the country’s pacifist constitution in favour of a more activist foreign policy. But Abe’s rise to power and efforts to make Japan a “normal country” were also fuelled by a major external factor, namely the rise of China.
China has displaced Japan as the pre-eminent power in Asia in the past two decades. By the late 2000s, China replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest economy.
Technology, talent and a modern military – Xi wants it all for China
Technology, talent and a modern military – Xi wants it all for China
Even more dramatic was the shift in regional balance of military power. Despite its pacifist constitution, Japan has maintained a modern, relatively sizeable armed forces. At the beginning of this century, its defence budget was about 60 per cent larger than China’s. By 2021, Japan’s defence budget of US$54 billion was less than a fifth of China’s estimated US$293 billion.
Festering maritime disputes in the East China Sea and the prospect of war over Taiwan has only deepened Japan’s sense of vulnerability. Thus, the country’s recent decision to expand its defence spending is largely an effort to catch up with the rapid shift in regional balance of power.
Finally, Japan’s new defence posture is also a reflection of the country’s growing anxieties over the direction of US foreign policy. While the fear of strategic abandonment has always lurked in the background, the “America First” Donald Trump presidency exposed the inherent fragility of Washington’s commitment to regional allies.
In response, Japan has expanded bilateral and “minilateral” defence cooperation with a host of like-minded powers. This explains why, among others, Japan has decided to build a joint next-generation fighter jet with European partners rather than with the US. With the US also shunning free trade regimes, Japan is relying on European and Indo-Pacific partners to shore up its economic influence and boost global trade.
The ultimate challenge for Japan, however, is to ensure its efforts to enhance its defence capabilities don’t trigger aggressive response by neighbouring states, undermine its image as a benign power and exacerbate US-China geopolitical competition in the region.
or their part, Southeast Asian nations fervently hope Japan remains as a reliable and constructive partner with no hegemonic ambitions of its own.
Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific” and the forthcoming “Duterte’s Rise”
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