How China-US rivalry is hastening the marginalisation of Taiwan
Tian Feilong says America’s use of Taiwan as a bargaining chip in its tussle with China is upsetting the status quo of cross-strait relations. With the DPP government in Taiwan also becoming more provocative, Beijing is being forced to respond
No doubt Taiwan’s fascination with the myth of independence plays a role in its predicament, but the main reason is the changing global order inspired by the rivalry between China and the US.
Any serious discussion about Taiwan must be framed by the larger context of China-US relations.
The US approach is shaped by its two contradictory policies on China. The first is its “one China” policy, the result of three Sino-US joint communiqués and in place since president Richard Nixon’s time. The second is America’s special relationship with Taiwan, centred on its 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and a basis for its geopolitical strategy to check and contain China’s rise.
In foreign policy circles in the US, the doves favour engagement with Beijing while the hawks lean towards containment.
This year marks the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening up. Over the past 40 years, US policy has tended towards engagement, on the belief that a good relationship with China would not only enable Chinese integration into the Western democratic system, but also open up the lucrative Chinese market to American business.
Against this backdrop of China-US rivalry, Taiwan has become an important part of the US strategy.
On Taipei’s part, attention from the US is welcome at a time when the island is coming under mounting pressure from Beijing. Since the DPP returned to power in the 2016 elections, the island has become more active in its push for independence. The DPP government has also abandoned the “1992 consensus”, a cornerstone of cross-strait peace.
The Taiwan issue is a “leftover problem” that originated in China’s civil war, and Beijing regards Taiwan as a core interest that it will never give up. However, for the reasons outlined above, political reconciliation between the two sides, and ultimately reunification, has become increasingly unlikely. And the provocative behaviour of the independence-leaning DPP will only increase the possibility that China would take control of Taiwan by force.
With these question marks hanging over Taiwan’s security, foreign investors are likely to stay away while local investors find greener pastures elsewhere. This is the inescapable larger trend. Yet, the DPP has failed to appreciate that the 1992 consensus is a prerequisite for the sustainable development of the Taiwanese economy.
Both the 1992 consensus and the “one China” policy are important. The 1992 consensus must remain valid for the US to stop the mainland from unilaterally resolving the Taiwan issue, and the “one China” principle must be in force for it to rein in Taiwan’s radical independence forces.
The China hawks in the US blame the failure of the country’s China policy on its misunderstanding of Chinese intent. But in fact, the fault lies in the DPP’s abandonment of the 1992 consensus and moves towards independence, as well as the US enactment of the Taiwan Travel Act, which gave Taiwan unrealistic expectations of its political future.
Thus, the US and Taiwan have jointly upset the status quo that has existed for decades, and are forcing Beijing to seriously consider taking control of Taiwan by force, under the provisions of its Anti-Secession Law.
By aligning itself with the US, the DPP government in Taiwan has turned its back on being part of the Chinese nation. It could be called a separatist regime. In short, the DPP’s decision to stand against the people on both sides of the strait will only hasten Taiwan’s marginalisation, weakening the economic strength, geopolitical clout and global position of this so-called “beacon of democracy in Asia”.
Tian Feilong is an associate professor at Beihang University’s Law School in Beijing